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IS THE SUPPLYING OF FOOD IN A RESTAURANT
A SALE OR A SERVICE?
A variety of legal problems has arisen from the serving of food in
a restaurant. Perhaps the most frequent one concerns the question
whether the service of food constitutes in law a sale or a service. This
problem has given difficulty in the fields of torts, contracts, criminal
law and even in the field of taxation. A comparison of decisions relat-
ing to this problem in those fields reveals a considerable conflict and
a lack of uniformity.
It appears to be well established that when a patron of a restaurant
is made ill from the partaking of food served for his consumption, he
has a valid cause of action. But the question immediately arises, is his
action one in tort, or is it based on contract? In other words, is the
restaurant proprietor's liability for the injury caused by the food based
on negligence, or upon an implied warranty that the food is fit for con-
sumption? It can be readily seen that the extent of the liability will
depend solely upon whether the supplying of food to patrons is to be
considered as a sale of the goods or merely as a service.
In the earlier cases the weight of authority was, in the absence of
statute, that one serving food to be consumed on the premises was not
an insurer of the fitness and wholesomeness of the food served.1 Such
a one was liable only where there was a failure to exercise reasonable
care as to the quality and preparation of the food.
Thus, in the case of Merrill v. Hobson? the plaintiff entered the
defendant's restaurant and ate what was designated on the bill of
fare as "creamed sweet breads." The food caused the plaintiff to
become ill. In suing the restaurant keeper, the plaintiff based his
claim for damages on the theory that a sale of the food had taken place.
But the court held that the true essence of the transaction was a service.
This service, said the court, involves the satisfaction of a human need,
to which the consumption of food is an essential incident since before
the consumption of food title does not pass, and after consumption
nothing remains to which the right of property can be said to attach.
However, a number of cases have adopted a view contrary to this
weight-of-authority principle of the common law stated above, holding
that one who serves food to be consumed upon the premises does
impliedly warrant the same is fit and wholesome for human consump-
'Rowe v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 29 Ga. App. 151, 113 S.E. 823 (1922);
Loucks v. Morley, 39 Cal. App. 578, 179 Pac. 529 (1919); Greenwood Cafe
v. Lovinggood, 197 Ala. 34, 72 So. 354 (1916); Kenney v. Wong Len, 181
N.H. 427, 128 Atl. 343 (1925); McPherson v. Capuano, 31 Ga. App. 82, 121
S.E. 580 (1924); King v. Davis (App. D.C. 1924) 296 Fed. 986.
288 Corn. 314, 91 AUt. 533 (1914).
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tion.3 As an example, in a New York decision, Temple v. Keeler,4 an
action was brought to recover damages for injuries alleged to have
been suffered by the plaintiff as a result of eating fish in defendant's
restaurant. Recovery was permitted upon the theory that a sale had
taken place. The court stated that where a customer enters a restaurant,
receives, eats and pays for food, the transaction is a purchase of goods.
The court further said that under the circumstances the buyer by
implication makes known to the vendor the particular purpose for
which the article is required and the buyer may assume that he can
rely upon the latter's skill and judgment. Consequently, there was an
implied warranty that the food was fit for consumption.
Likewise, in decisions under the Uniform Sales Act,- the tendency
of the courts seems to be, in the majority of cases, to hold the service
of food in a restaurant to be a sale rather than a service, as in the
case of Ford v. Waldorf System Inc.6 where the plaintiff was suing
for damages because of injuries resulting from a piece of wood con-
tained in beans served to him at defendant's restaurant. Here the court
held that food supplied to customers at a restaurant is a "sale of goods"
and not the mere furnishing of service, and a customer injured thereby
can recover in an action based on an implied warranty of quality under
the Uniform Sales Act, since the transaction was a sale of goods within
the meaning of the Act.
But like the conflict existing under the common law as to this ques-
tion, there are decisions under the Sales Act contrary to the preceding
case, such as the case of Nisky v. Childs Co.7 wherein the court held
that a service was performed by defendant when plaintiff was served
oysters which resulted in plaintiff's illness, for which she sought dam-
ages. The plaintiff had contended that a breach of warranty resulted
from the service of the oysters under section 15 of the Sales Act."
However the court in this jurisdiction stated that the serving of food
cannot be regarded as a sale either at common law or under the Sales
Act which, the court stated, is merely declaratory of the common law.
sLeahy v. Essex Co., 148 N.Y. Supp. 1063 (1914); Greenwood v. Thompson
Co., 213 Ill. App. 371 (1919); Barringer v. Ocean S. S. Co., 240 Mass. 405,
134 N.E. 265 (1922); Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120
N.E. 407 (1918).
4238 N.Y. 344, 144 N.E. 635, 35 A.L.R. 920 (1924).
5 American Uniform Commercial Acts, p. 70; Uniform Sales Act § 15 (1):
"Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller
the particular purpose for which the goods are to be required, and it appears
that the buyer relies upon the seller's skill and judgment, there is an implied
warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose."
657 R.I. 131, 188 Atl. 633 (1936) ; Accord: Haise v. Gillette, 83 Ind. App. 551,
149 N.E. 182 (1925).
7 103 N.J.L. 464, 135 Atl. 805 (1927).
8 Supra, note 5.
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The problem has arisen in only a few criminal cases. However,
while the courts may be in conflict where the question involves the col-
lection of damages for injuries resulting from consuming improper
food in a restaurant, they have agreed that for the purpose of enforc-
ing a criminal statute the consumption of food in a restaurant is a sale.
Thus, in the case of Commonwealth v. Miller9 the defendant oper-
ated a restaurant in which he served oleomargarine with a regular
meal as a substitute for butter. As a result he was indicted and con-
victed under a statute entitled, "An act for the protection of the public
health, and to prevent alteration of dairy products, and fraud in the
sale thereof." On appeal the conviction was affirmed on the theory
that the serving of the oleomargarine was a sale within the meaning
of the statute for which the proprietor could be properly indicted and
convicted. However, one of the judges dissented on the reasoning that
such a transaction of the oleomargarine was not a sale, saying: "If
it was the intention of the legislature to prohibit not only the sale of
oleomargarine, but also its use as an article of food by the proprietors
of eating houses, it was easy to have said so in express terms. I am
unable to see how the legal or popular meaning of the word 'sale' will
support this judgment. I find nothing in the facts to justify that there
was a sale of the oleomargarine."
In the case of State v. Phoenix Hotel Co.,10 a statute prohibited the
sale of certain game among which one of the protected species was
quail. The defendant was indicted for serving quail, in his hotel dining
room, to two of his guests who ate and paid for the same. Upon the
trial of the case the defendant's argument was that serving quail in
this manner is not exposing it for sale within the meaning of the
statute. But the court held that the quail was sold the same as if it
had been purchased from a dealer and carried home by the purchaser
to be served at his own table. Also in the similar case of State v. Clair l
the defendant served two patrons with partridges and was indicted
under a statute which prohibited the selling of game out of season.
It was likewise held'that the partridges so served were sold and came
within the prohibition of the statute. In another case, Commonwealth
v. Warren,2 the defendant served a breakfast to one Kelly. Included
in the breakfast was a glass of milk part of which was taken away and
analyzed by a chemist and found to contain less than thirteen per cent
of milk solids. An action was brought based upon a statute for the
selling of milk not of a standard quality. The defendant requested sev-
eral rulings, one which was to the effect that there was no sale of the
9 131 Pa. 118, 18 At. 938 (1890).L0 157 Ky. 180, 162 S.W. 823 (1914).
11 221 N.Y. 108, 116 N.E. 868 (1917).
12160 Mass. 533, 36 N.E. 308 (1894).
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milk. The ruling was refused, the court saying: "the delivery of milk
to the purchaser of a breakfast, as a part of such breakfast, is as much
a sale of the milk as if a special price had been put on it, or it had
been bought and paid for by itself."
In those states where a sales tax is in effect this problem has been
solved by all courts consistently holding that regardless as to what the
consumption of food might be for other purposes, it was a sale within
the meaning of the Sales Tax Act.
In the case of Pappanastos v. State Tax Commission'3 the plaintiff
claimed he was not liable for food and drink served to his customers
under the Sales Tax Act. The amount of the tax was to be governed
by the gross sales of any tangible personal property whatever. The
plaintiff's defense was that in conducting his business there was in
fact no sale and consequently the act had no application. The court
held that under the common law the furnishing of food at a restaurant
is not a sale but merely a service. But, under the Tax Act, the serving
of food and drink by a restaurant operator constituted a sale so as to
make restaurant operators liable for the tax.
Likewise, in Liggett Drug Co. v. Lee1 4 the plaintiff's contention was
that gross receipts derived from the operation of lunch and sandwich
stands where meals are served, are exempt from the tax on gross sales.
The plaintiff insisted that the serving of meals was not a sale and
therefore could not be included under the term "gross sales." But the
court held that the tax was computable on sales of articles of food and
drink dispensed at plaintiff's lunch counter, and the transactions taking
place there are beyond question "sales at retail" and come within the
Act.
In the similar case of Brevoort Hotel Co. v. Ames,'5 the plaintiff
was seeking to enjoin the defendant in the collection of a tax at the
rate of two per cent on his gross receipts from the furnishing of food
in his hotel. The plaintiff based his case on the fact that the serving
of a meal to a patron of a hotel is not a sale within the ordinary mean-
ing of the term. It was held that the serving of the food constituted
a transfer of the ownership to the purchaser for the use of consump-
tion, and amounted to a sale under the act, and was subject to the tax
imposed.
Not only is there a lack of uniformity among states on the ques-
tion whether the consumption of food in a restaurant is a sale or service
-which we might expect-but there is also no uniformity within certain
states. New York, Illinois, and Massachusetts are each consistent in
13 235 Ala. 50, 177 So. 158 (1937).
'4126 Fla. 359, 171 So. 326 (1937).
15360 I1. 485, 196 N.E. 461 (1935).
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holding that the consumption of food is a sale. The Alabama Court pre-
sents an outstanding example of inconsistency within a state. For exam-
ple, in the case of Greenwood Cafe v. Lovinggood'6 the court held that
in an action for damages the relationship between restaurant keeper and
customer is one of service and not of sale. The same court in the case
of Pappanastos v. State Tax Commission" held that a like transaction
was a sale for the purpose of collecting a sales tax. However, in all
cases arising under criminal statutes, the courts are consistent in hold-
ing that for the purpose of enforcing the statutes the consumption of
food in a restaurant is a sale.
In summation, therefore, it appears to depend to a large extent in
which field of law the problem arises as to whether food served in a
restaurant will constitute a sale or a service.
MATTHEW DOYLE.
16 197 Ala. 34, 72 So. 345 (1935).
17 235 Ala. 50, 177 So. 158 (1937).
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